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The relationship of intercollegiate athletics and the federal Title IX statute has been 
the subject of significant concern and academic inquiry. This article explores the legal 
and legislative history of Title IX and the statute’s impact on intercollegiate athletic 
programs and practical solutions for compliance. The article is broken into three dis-
tinct parts. Part I details a brief history of Title IX congressional, judicial, and regula-
tory involvement/enforcement over the past 36 years. Part II examines Title IX’s 
application in practice with regard to public institutions and athletics. In Part III, the 
researchers present recommendations to wrestling programs and other men’s teams 
concerning the economic realities of intercollegiate athletics. Specifically the 
researchers examine the wrestling community’s legal and legislative challenges and 
explain how colleges’ economic decisions and zeal for competitive teams at the “rev-
enue sports” level are at the core of wrestling’s dilemma rather than the law itself. The 
researchers also suggest more constructive solutions for preserving and expanding 
athletic opportunities for all without cutting men’s sports programs. In particular, they 
argue that instead of attacking Title IX and women’s sports, the wrestling community 
should form alliances with women’s teams and their advocates to reverse the realloca-
tion of resources in the college athletics arms race.
The perception that Title IX and gender equity requirements are responsible 
for the loss of hundreds of intercollegiate wrestling programs is widely accepted 
by many who are affiliated with the sport (Benson, 2007; Hughes, 1999; Ridpath, 
2007a, b). On the surface, the evidence appears to support that contention, as some 
athletic directors and university presidents over the past two decades, in an effort 
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to comply with Title IX requirements, have chosen either to eliminate men’s ath-
letic programs or reduce them to the club level. The number of NCAA wrestling 
programs in NCAA Divisions I, II, and III dropped from 234 to 129 over the 
course of an NCAA participation study conducted from 1982 to 2000 (Benson, 
2007). The trend continued with the loss of several wrestling programs in 2007 
including the University of Oregon’s nationally competitive program, ostensibly 
for gender equity reasons. Whether this is true or not is open to debate because 
Oregon proceeded, at the same time, to add the sport of baseball. (N. Tublitz, per-
sonal communication, July 16, 2007; Oregon to reinstate baseball, drop wrestling, 
2007). In addition, fifty-five men’s NCAA Division I gymnastics programs—
roughly 69%—were dropped during a time span similar to that of the NCAA study 
(Ridpath, 2007a, b). The NCAA Division I membership, which typically includes 
the largest colleges and universities in the nation, along with those that play in the 
Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS; formerly Division I-A) and the Football Cham-
pionship Subdivision (formerly I-AA), continues to argue that men’s programs are 
being eliminated for purposes of promoting gender equity (Benson, 2007).
In late 2006, James Madison University (JMU) announced the elimination of 
10 varsity athletic teams, including 7 men’s teams (archery, cross country, gym-
nastics, indoor/outdoor track, swimming, and wrestling) and 3 women’s teams 
(archery, fencing, and gymnastics; Brady, 2007). This is another in a long history 
of athletic teams, most notably wrestling, being eliminated under the guise of Title 
IX compliance (Suggs, 2005). Some athletes from these teams challenged the cuts 
by filing a lawsuit against both JMU for eliminating the teams and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education (DOE; Equity in Athletics v. Department of Education, et al., 
2007). The United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia denied 
the injunction, and the cuts went into effect in July 1, 2007. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the decision in August 2008. 
(Equity in Athletics v. Department of Education, et al.).
The James Madison University case is one of the latest in a series of spirited 
but unsuccessful suits filed by the National Wrestling Coaches Association 
(NWCA) and the College Sports Council (CSC) against the DOE after several 
colleges eliminated varsity men’s wrestling programs. The lawsuits challenged 
DOE’s implementation of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (CSC v. 
DOE, 2006; CSC v. General Accounting Office, 2003; CSC v. Paige, 2003; NWCA 
v. DOE, 2003).
The NWCA along with wrestlers who have had their sport eliminated, argued, 
and continue to argue, that DOE’s interpretation of Title IX—including its 1979 
Policy Interpretation and its 1996 clarification on that Policy Interpretation’s 
three-part test for measuring participation equity–discriminates against men and 
causes colleges to eliminate men’s varsity college teams. In effect, they claim 
“reverse” discrimination and blame Title IX for the loss of a variety of men’s ath-
letic teams, including wrestling.
Part I of this article details the history of Title IX and intercollegiate athletics 
at public institutions. It includes the long history of congressional, judicial, and 
regulatory challenges to the law. This history demonstrates that the wrestling 
community’s arguments are not new; rather they are part of a 36-year battle against 
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Title IX and athletic equity. Part II examines Title IX’s application in practice. It 
further details the wrestling community’s most recent legal and legislative strate-
gies and explains why their factual and legal bases have been consistently denied. 
In Part III, the authors explain how the loss of men’s programs is related more to 
institutional decisions to focus on revenue generating sports such as men’s foot-
ball and basketball than to meet Title IX requirements. These economic decisions, 
arguably, are the root causes of wrestling’s problems. In Part III the authors also 
present what may be more realistic, constructive solutions to the problems faced 
by wrestlers and athletes in other men’s programs. Specifically, the researchers 
argue that instead of challenging Title IX and women’s sports, the wrestling com-
munity should form alliances with Title IX advocates and other supporters of 
women’s programs to reverse the flow of resources in college athletics’ major 
sports arms race, safeguard men’s minor sport teams, and work to expand oppor-
tunities for women, including the expansion of teams in women’s wrestling.
Part I: History of Title IX and Congressional Intent
In 1972, 170,384 men played varsity college sports under the auspices of the 
NCAA—a group that had governed and provided national championships for 
men’s intercollegiate athletics since 1906 (NCAA, 2007d). At the same time, only 
29,977 women played varsity college sports, primarily under the auspices of the 
American Intercollegiate Athletic Association for Women (AIAW; NCAA, 2003, 
p. 13–14). Many schools failed to offer any women’s sports at all, and those rela-
tively few female athletes who were fortunate enough to compete still received 
less support than their male counterparts. Compared with athletes on the men’s 
teams, women typically received inferior equipment, uniforms, facilities, travel 
accommodations, and coaching support, to name only a few areas of unequal 
treatment. This discriminatory situation preceded the NCAA’s involvement with 
women’s sports (Crowley, 2006; NCAA, 2007d).
The passage of Title IX was supposed to end discrimination in all federally 
funded education programs—including athletics. While the law succeeded in 
many ways, men’s athletics was now required to share already limited resources 
with expanding women’s programs. Progress toward gender equity, consequently, 
was often perceived by men as a threat to their own welfare.
This is ironic because the statute was not aimed specifically at athletics. In 
fact, many did not see Title IX as an athletics-specific piece of legislation and least 
of all as something that, in the name of equity, could negatively impact men’s 
programs. This misunderstanding of the law by the public led to many of the 
misguided attacks Title IX from the initiation of this legislation to the present day. 
A review of this history demonstrates that Congress fully considered—and 
rejected—a variety of counter arguments at the time Title IX was passed. The 
courts have done the same during the intervening years (Lopiano, 2001). This 
helps to explain why wrestling advocates keep losing their legal challenges to 
Title IX and why many researchers suggest it is time for the wrestling community 
to try something new.
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The 1970s—Title IX and Its Regulations
Congress passed Title IX in 1972. Its primary provision consistently states:
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance. (20 U.S.C. §1681–1688, 1972)
Given the broad scope of this language, Congress directed the executive 
branch to issue regulations to more thoroughly explain the requirements of the 
law. (20 U.S.C. §1682, 1972). The U.S. Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (HEW) published draft regulations for public comment in June 1974. The 
NCAA, the College Football Coaches Association (CFCA), and other men’s 
sporting groups opposed the application of the law to athletics. They lobbied 
HEW to change the regulations, and they lobbied Congress to reject them. How-
ever, during congressional hearings on the matter, HEW Secretary Caspar Wein-
berger noted that the plain language of Title IX covers all educational programs. 
Congress did not write the statute to exclude athletics, football, or any other pro-
gram, so the regulations could not exclude them.
Football advocates then tried to convince Congress to amend Title IX to 
exclude athletics. When that failed, they lobbied to exempt sports that produced 
gross revenue (notably not net revenue or profits). Their goal was to exempt foot-
ball from Title IX. (Tower Amendment submitted on May 20, 1974, 120 Cong. 
Rec. 15,322–15,323, 1974). Congress refused to do it. Instead, it adopted a com-
promise amendment offered by Senator Jacob Javits (R-New York) that was 
intended to recognize that some sports cost more than others to operate so that 
equal treatment did not necessarily mean equal funding. It specifically directed 
HEW to issue Title IX regulations that included: “with respect to intercollegiate 
athletic activities, reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular 
sports” {(Javits Amendment, Sen. Conf. Rep. No. 1026, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 
4271 (1974)}.
Over the next year, HEW received more than 10,000 comments on Title IX 
regulations—most of them related to athletics. (Title IX basics: Breaking down 
barriers, 2008, p15, ¶1). After revising the regulations, HEW submitted them for 
President Ford’s signature on May 27, 1975, and then submitted them to Congress 
for final review (40 Fed. Reg. 24,128, June 4, 1975). At that time, federal law 
mandated that Congress have an opportunity to review and comment on such 
regulations before they could go into effect. If Congress believed the regulations 
failed to reflect statutory intent, it could pass concurrent resolutions rejecting them 
in whole or in part {(General Education Provisions Act, Pub.L. 93–380, 88 Stat. 
567, as amended §20 U.S.C. 1232(d)(1)}.
Congress took this obligation seriously and held several days of hearings over 
the spring and summer of 1975. Men’s sporting interests dominated the testimony. 
Their congressional supporters submitted several resolutions to reject the regula-
tions entirely, to exclude athletics, or to exclude “revenue-producing” sports. They 
argued that the regulations required “quotas” and constituted “reverse 
discrimination”—essentially the same arguments still made today. Title IX sup-
porters countered that the regulations did not promote reverse discrimination 
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against males but instead stopped the preferential treatment those males had 
always enjoyed (Hearings on H.Con.Res. 330). Once again, this legislative history 
provides insight into reasons for the failure of the wrestling community and others 
in more recent times. Their appeals have been unsuccessful, in part, because they 
used the same arguments as those employed by football and wrestling coaches in 
front of Congress in the 1970s. Congress fully considered and rejected each of 
those arguments at that time. It is not surprising that the Courts similarly reject 
them today.
Early Court Challenges
The legislative arena was not the only venue for the Title IX debate. The NCAA 
filed a lawsuit against HEW that argued that the regulations (1) exceeded the 
authority of the statute by covering athletics at all, (2) established sex-based 
quotas, (3) were unconstitutionally vague, and (4) were arbitrary and capricious 
under the Administrative Procedure Act (NCAA v. Califano,1978). The Western 
District of Missouri Court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing (NCAA v. 
Califano). By the time the appellate court reversed the decision, other legal actions 
were in the works to challenge Title IX, and the NCAA began the takeover of 
women’s sports from the AIAW to assuage members’ fears that separate gover-
nance structures could be seen as violations of Title IX (Crowley, 2006).
Schools themselves took up the charge in the late 1970s, arguing that their 
athletic programs did not have to comply with Title IX because the programs 
themselves did not receive direct financial assistance from the federal govern-
ment. They sued HEW to prevent it from investigating their programs and from 
withholding federal funding (Bell v. Dougherty, 1982; Bennett v. West Texas State 
University, 1986; Department of Education v. Seattle University, 1982; Dough-
erty County School System v. Harris, 1980; Isleboro School Comm. v. Califano, 
1979; Junior College Dist. of St. Louis v. Califano, 1979; North Haven Board of 
Education v. Bell, 1982; Othen v. Ann Arbor School Board, 1981; Romeo Com-
munity Schools v. HEW, 1977; Seattle University v. HEW, 1980; Wright v. Colum-
bia University, 1981). HEW insisted that if a school received any federal funding, 
then all of its educational programs, including athletics, were covered by Title IX 
(Title IX basics: Breaking down barriers, 2008.). These legal battles delayed 
enforcement of Title IX in athletics. The debate was clearly destined for the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
In July 1976, Grove City College refused to sign the Assurance of Compli-
ance required by 45 C.F.R. 86.4(a) now 34 C.F.R. 106.4(a), arguing that it did not 
receive federal financial assistance and thus was not covered by Title IX. HEW 
argued that the school received such funding through the federal tuition grants and 
loans paid to its students. In November 1978, Grove City filed a lawsuit to enjoin 
HEW from requiring Title IX compliance as a condition for providing grants and 
loans to its students. The U.S. Supreme Court eventually sided with Grove City 
and held that Title IX applied only to educational programs that actually received 
federal funds—and not to institutions as a whole (Grove City College v. Bell, 
1984).
The Supreme Court’s opinion caused DOE to stop all Title IX athletics inves-
tigations in their tracks. OCR dismissed hundreds of administrative complaints. 
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Courts dismissed several pending cases. (Bennett v. West Texas State University, 
1986; Haffer v. Temple University, 1981; O’Connor v. Peru State College, 1984). 
Title IX remained virtually unenforced until Congress passed the Civil Rights 
Restoration Act of 1987, which clarified that Congress intended Title IX to apply 
to an entire school if any of its programs or activities receive federal funding. (20 
U.S.C. §1687). The law finally went into effect in 1988—16 years after Title IX’s 
enactment.
Part II: Wrestling and Title IX
The 1990s—Private Enforcement
Female athletes finally began to fight for their rights under Title IX in the early 
1990s, some 20 years after the law’s passage. They sued Colgate University, Indi-
ana University of Pennsylvania, Colorado State University, and Brown University 
after the schools eliminated their athletic teams (Cohen v. Brown University, 1992; 
Cook v. Colgate University, 1992; Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 
1993; Roberts v. Colorado State University, 1993). These cases applied the 1979 
Policy Interpretation on Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics for the first time. 
The case against Brown University illustrates the arguments made by institutions 
and later the NWCA.
The Cohen v. Brown University litigation is one of the landmark cases with 
regard to Title IX enforcement. In 1990–91, Brown University sponsored 31 var-
sity sports, including 16 sports for 566 men (63.3% of the athletes at Brown) and 
15 sports for 328 women (36.7% of the athletes at Brown). In the spring, Brown 
directed its athletic department to cut its budget by 5–8%. It decided to meet those 
budget cuts in part by demoting four varsity teams (men’s water polo, men’s golf, 
women’s gymnastics, and women’s volleyball) to club status. In 1992, the wom-
en’s teams filed a Title IX lawsuit against Brown and successfully moved for a 
preliminary injunction to protect the affected teams (Cohen v. Brown University, 
1992). The injunction was made permanent after a trial on the merits of the case. 
In ruling for the women’s teams, the Cohen court had to interpret and apply Title 
IX’s equal athletic participation opportunity regulation which provides:
Equal Opportunity. A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, 
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic oppor-
tunity for members of both sexes. In determining whether equal opportunities 
are available the Director will consider, among other factors, whether the 
selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the 
interests and abilities of members of both sexes. {34 C.F.R. 106.4 (c)(1)}
The court looked to the 1979 Policy Interpretation for guidance. It describes 
equal opportunity for athletic participation in terms of the following 3-part test:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female 
students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their 
respective enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented among 
intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history and 
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continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive 
to the developing interest and abilities of the members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of the one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate 
athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program 
expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that 
the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and 
effectively accommodated by the present program. {(71418 (C.5.a.(1)–(3) 
Policy Interpretation); A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate 
Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 et seq. (Dec. 18, 1979)}
Brown University vigorously opposed application of the 3-part test by argu-
ing that (1) prong 1 mandates an unconstitutional, affirmative action quota and (2) 
equality should be measured not by equal opportunity but by the perceived rela-
tive interests of the student body in athletics. The District Court of Rhode Island 
and two panels of the First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both arguments.
The Cohen court recognized that athletics is unlike any other educational 
program, because it is sex segregated. Unlike the classroom, male and female 
students do not compete against each other for the same opportunities. Every 
school decides exactly how many opportunities it will provide to male and female 
students when it decides which sports to offer for each sex. There is no such thing 
as a “quota” in such a system, because as the Cohen court noted:
In this unique context, Title IX operates to ensure that the gender-segregated 
allocation of athletic opportunities does not disadvantage either gender. 
Rather than create a quota or preference, this unavoidably gender-conscious 
comparison merely provides for the allocation of athletics resources and par-
ticipation opportunities between the sexes in a non-discriminatory manner. 
(Cohen v. Brown University, 1992)
The researchers contend, and the Brown University case decision later dem-
onstrated, the only way to provide each student with an equal opportunity to par-
ticipate in sports is to provide participation opportunities that mirror enrollment. 
If a public educational institution with an overall enrollment of 1000 of which 
60% are females, only has enough money to provide 500 athletic participation 
opportunities, 60% of them (300) should be allocated to females and 40% of them 
(200) should be allocated to males. That way, each of the 400 males still has a 1 
in 2 chance to play sports, as does each of the 600 females. This rationale is the 
basis for prong 1, substantial proportionality. While it does not dictate how many 
opportunities a school must provide, it does require that they be allocated equita-
bly. Otherwise, schools might recruit only enough women athletes to fill the slots 
they choose to create, rather than enough women to take advantage of a truly 
equitable program. “Substantial proportionality” has come to be regarded as the 
strongest test by which to measure equality in a sex-segregated program.
Brown University also argued that equity should not be based upon actual 
equal opportunity but upon equal satisfaction of the perceived relative interests of 
male and female students in athletics (Cohen v. Brown University, 1992). This 
view presumes that males are inherently more interested in sports, and thus more 
opportunities should be provided to satisfy those interests. To illustrate this theory 
of differential interest, we can picture a school that has 1,000 students, but this 
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time evenly divided with 500 males and 500 females. It has enough money for 
only 500 athletic participation opportunities. If 75% of males (375) are “inter-
ested” in playing sports, while only 50% of females (250) are similarly interested, 
then opportunities should be provided in line with this ratio of interest or need. In 
this example, with 625 “interested” athletes, and only 500 slots available, only 
80% of the participation opportunities could be filled. This would mean that 300 
of the 375 “interested” males and 200 of the 250 “interested” females would be 
provided sport opportunities. This methodology, in effect, would reallocate 50 
opportunities from females to males.
The Cohen court emphatically rejected use of the relative interests test in 
place of OCR’s 3-part test (Cohen v. Brown University, 1992). As a legal matter, 
the court held that the 1979 Policy Interpretation was entitled to “considerable 
weight” as an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation (Cohen v. Brown Uni-
versity, 1992, p. 988). Prong 3 of that test examines whether “the interests and 
abilities of the members of the under-represented sex have been fully and effec-
tively accommodated.” Both First Circuit panels in Cohen rejected the “relative 
interests” test because it would read the “full” out of the duty to fully and effec-
tively accommodate the under-represented sex and would lock in current patterns 
of discrimination and men’s historical advantages. The court emphasized that the 
test cannot withstand scrutiny on either legal or policy grounds because it disad-
vantages women and undermines the remedial purposes of Title IX by limiting 
required program expansion for the under-represented sex to the status quo of 
relative interests (Cohen v. Brown University, 1997).
The Cohen court further held to allow schools to provide fewer athletic par-
ticipation opportunities to females based upon the premise that women are less 
interested in sports than men is, among other things, to ignore the fact that Title 
IX was enacted to remedy discrimination that results from stereotyped notions of 
women’s interests and abilities. Interest and ability rarely develop in a vacuum; 
they evolve as a function of opportunity and experience. The Policy Interpretation 
recognizes that women’s lower rate of participation in athletics reflects women’s 
historical lack of opportunities to participate in sports (Cohen v. Brown Univer-
sity, 1997), and the Brown University decision became the case precedent that 
other Title IX challenges would be measured against.
Although not the original intent, the creation of opportunities that would 
develop interest and encourage women to participate in sports became a central 
purpose of Title IX. The growing theory among supporters was that more roster 
spots and scholarships would gradually increase demand among women for those 
roster spots and scholarships (Neal v. Bd. of Trustees Cal State Univ., 1999; 
Yuracko, 2002). Use of a relative interests test would instead “hinder and quite 
possibly reverse the steady increases in women’s participation and interest in 
sports that have followed Title IX’s enactment” (Neal, p. 769). In other words, it 
was argued that women are not inherently less interested in sports. Any disparity 
in “relative interests” is caused by longtime discrimination—discrimination that 
Congress enacted Title IX to eliminate. Thus, every court that has considered the 
relative interests test, including all the Cohen courts, has rejected it(Chalenor v. 
Univ. of North Dakota, 2002; Cohen v. Brown University 1992; 1997; Pederson v. 
LSU, 2000; Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 1994; Miami University Wrestling Club v. 
Miami University of Ohio, 2002; Neal, 1999).
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1995–A Return to Congress
The early Title IX cases literally sent panic throughout the college ranks. As Colo-
rado State University argued, if it had violated the 3-part test, then every college 
in America did also (Roberts v. Colorado State, 1993). Colleges and interest 
groups such as the AFCA lobbied Congress again to amend Title IX. Some sought 
to gain more leeway in prong 1. Others sought to exclude football entirely, as they 
had in 1970s. In May 1995, Congress held hearings and listened to the complaints 
of these interest groups again. (Cong. Rec. H4597, 1995).
Rep. Dennis Hastert (R-IL), a former high school wrestling coach, took the 
House floor on May 9, 1995, to ask his colleagues to amend Title IX. He blamed 
Title IX for the fact that four colleges in his state had either dropped or threatened 
to drop men’s wrestling programs (Cong. Rec. H4597, 1995). Rep. Carolyn 
Mahoney (D-NY), on the other hand, retorted that schools were using Title IX as 
a convenient excuse for their own budget problems (Cong. Rec. E972, 1995). Still 
others argued that schools were blaming Title IX to galvanize the wrestling com-
munity and others to do their dirty work for them—convincing Congress to amend 
Title IX to relieve schools of their responsibilities (Cong. Rec. E972, 1995). Rep. 
Hastert attached an amendment into a U.S. Department of Labor/Health and 
Human Services appropriations bill (H.R. 2127, 1996) that directed DOE to 
reevaluate its 3-part test and to provide Congress with a clarification of that test.
Although the Senate removed that rider before passing the bill, OCR pro-
ceeded to prepare a detailed clarification of the 3-part test that it distributed for 
comment in September 1995. The final document was distributed in January 1996. 
This 1996 clarification reaffirms the 1979 Policy Interpretation’s 3-part test and 
gives clear direction (with examples) on how it should be applied (Reynolds, 
2003). In the end, after more heated debate, wrestlers and other interested parties 
were unable to convince Congress to amend Title IX or OCR to change its 
regulations.
Back to the Courts: Suits by Dropped Men’s Teams
Having been granted no relief by either Congress or OCR, the wrestling commu-
nity and others took their cause back to the courts. This time they sued the schools 
that eliminated the programs. Wrestlers filed lawsuits against Drake University, 
California State University at Bakersfield (CSB), the University of North Dakota 
(UND), and Miami University of Ohio. Men from other dropped sports filed suits 
against Illinois State University and the University of Illinois (Boulahanis v. Board 
of Regents, 1999; Chalenor v. University of North Dakota, 2000; Gonyo v. Drake 
University, 1995; Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 1994; Miami University Wrestling 
Club v. Miami University of Ohio, 2002; Neal, 1999). Those who represented the 
male athletes lost every one of these lawsuits primarily because they employed 
arguments that Congress, OCR, and prior courts had already rejected as contrary 
to the purposes and requirements of Title IX.
A recent, very public case involved Miami University of Ohio, which elimi-
nated three men’s sports in 1999, including wrestling. (Miami University Wres-
tling Club v. Miami University, 2001). In that situation, proponents of the wres-
tling program again argued that Miami’s consideration of gender in deciding 
264  Ridpath et al.
which sports to eliminate violated Title IX itself. To reach this position, the plain-
tiffs disregarded the 3-part test and instead argued that any consideration of gender 
in making a decision necessarily constituted illegal sex discrimination. The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio disagreed. It held that con-
sideration of gender is not per se a violation of Title IX, because athletics teams 
themselves were separated by gender (Miami University Wrestling Club). It fur-
ther held that the 1979 Policy Interpretation drew directly from the statute and was 
entitled to substantial deference. Accordingly, because males remained overrepre-
sented in the athletic department even after the team cuts, they could not claim sex 
discrimination (Miami University Wrestling Club).
Lawyers also alleged that Title IX, as applied to the wrestlers, violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution because 
it allowed Miami to cut men’s sports opportunities but not women’s. The court 
again disagreed. Consideration of sex is constitutionally permissible when it is 
substantially related to an important governmental objective (Miami University 
Wrestling Club). Furthermore, the court noted that Title IX’s objective of elimi-
nating long-term discrimination against women in federally funded programs is 
unequivocally an important governmental objective. Finally, by cutting the three 
men’s teams, Miami’s reallocation of its athletic department resources in fact 
reduced that discrimination and thus was permissible (Miami University Wres-
tling Club).
Every court that has considered cases filed on behalf of male athletes chal-
lenging the elimination of their teams has rejected them. Courts universally recog-
nize that colleges already overwhelmingly advantage males and provide them 
with more athletic opportunities than they provide females. Thus, even though 
individual wrestlers may lose the chance to wrestle, male students as a whole 
continue to receive the greater proportion of athletic opportunities. Thus, reduc-
tions, in themselves, do not constitute discrimination. With male opportunities 
still disproportionately high, it would appear that universities are choosing to 
favor some men’s sports (such as football) over others (such as wrestling). Since 
male teams were not making any gains by filing their own lawsuits, they turned to 
the NWCA for assistance and in 2002 the NWCA filed their own lawsuit.
The National Wrestling Coaches’ Association Lawsuit
Since lawsuits filed on behalf of collegiate teams had not been successful, propo-
nents of wrestling turned to the NWCA for assistance. In 2002 the NWCA filed 
its own lawsuit.
The NWCA’s complaint., aimed primarily at DOE, alleged that actions per-
mitted by Title IX’s 1979 Policy Interpretation and 1996 Clarification; (1) exceeded 
DOE’s authority under the statute, (2) violated the equal protection principles in 
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and (3) 
amended the Title IX regulation without complying with the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (NWCA v. DOE, 2003; 2005). It also alleged that DOE improperly 
denied the NWCA’s 1996 petition to amend or appeal the 1979 Policy Interpreta-
tion’s 3-part test (NWCA).
In support of its complaint, the NWCA alleged that females inherently have 
less interest in sports and that colleges are eliminating or limiting the size of men’s 
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teams to reach substantial proportionality under prong 1 of the 3-part test because 
there are not enough women interested in sports to add new teams. The NWCA 
asked the court to declare the 1979 Policy Interpretation and 1996 Clarification 
null and void and to issue new guidelines that adopt the relative interests’ tests 
rejected by all previous courts. DOE responded to the suit with a motion to dis-
miss for lack of jurisdiction under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 
claiming that the NWCA did not have the standing to sue required by Article III 
of the Constitution because there was no connection between the relief they sought 
(invalidation of Title IX athletic policies) and their perceived harm (NWCA v. 
DOE, 2003). In other words, it could not be established that DOE’s Title IX poli-
cies caused colleges to drop wrestling programs. In fact, it was noted that during 
the years that Title IX was not applied to athletics because of the Grove City deci-
sion, colleges eliminated men’s wrestling programs at a rate three times as great 
as they did after Title IX enforcement began. Thus, it could be argued that DOE’s 
Title IX athletic policies had little or nothing to do with the elimination of those 
teams (NWCA).
Moreover, even if the NWCA received the relief it requested, it would not 
redress the Wrestlers’ claimed injuries. Different policies would not cause schools 
to reinstate wrestling programs or stop other schools with budget problems from 
eliminating them—or any other sport, for that matter. For example, the court noted 
that the University of Illinois’ elimination of men’s swimming had nothing to do 
with the Title IX policies but rather was because “the program was historically 
weak, swimming is not a widely offered athletic activity in the high schools, and 
it does not have a large spectator following” (Kelley v. Board of Trustees, 1994, p. 
269). Only the schools that eliminated the teams—not DOE—could reinstate 
them, and those schools, the court noted, were not parties to the litigation. The 
supporters of wrestling, however, were well aware that suing the schools had not 
worked. Refocusing legal attention on the schools would no be a viable option.
After extensive briefing and oral argument—with the participation of amici 
on both sides—the District Court granted DOE’s motion and dismissed the case 
(NWCA v. DOE, 2003). This decision detailed the history of Title IX athletic poli-
cies and litigation and noted that every court that had addressed the propriety of 
Title IX’s athletic policies had upheld them—both when used by women athletes 
to force schools to add women’s sports and when challenged directly by male 
athletes (NWCA). Ultimately, the court found that the NWCA lacked standing 
because “this is not a case where ‘it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, 
if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association, actually 
injured” (p. 129). Because the NWCA’s appeals to the DC Circuit Court of Appeals 
and the U.S. Supreme Court also failed, Title IX’s athletic policies and interpreta-
tions remained in place.
A New Tactic: The Title IX Commission
After once again failing with Congress and in the courts, wrestling advocates 
turned to the executive branch. After the inauguration of George W. Bush in 2001, 
they lobbied DOE and the new administration to change its Title IX athletics 
guidelines. DOE responded affirmatively and appointed members to a newly 
formed Commission on Opportunity in Athletics (Commission) to study the issue 
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and to make recommendations about if and how the guidelines should be changed 
(Reynolds, 2003; Staurowsky, 2003).
Ten of the 15 commissioners came from the largest, most competitive NCAA 
Division I colleges with the largest and most expensive football programs. The 
Commission did not schedule witnesses from any new men’s teams or any elimi-
nated women’s teams. The vast majority of invited witnesses were brought in to 
testify about the reduction in men’s wrestling and gymnastics teams, and they 
singled out Title IX as the cause of these losses. No women who had lost their 
teams or who had been denied varsity status were invited to testify before the 
commission (Staurowsky, 2003; Yiamouyiannis, 2003).
In fact, in recent years schools have cut more women’s gymnastics programs 
than men’s teams—100 women’s teams vs. 56 men’s squads (General Accounting 
Office [GAO], 2001). In addition, while colleges had cut some men’s teams, over-
all number of sports and participation opportunities for males had increased (Stau-
rowsky, 2003). Many schools simply had reallocated resources from some men’s 
sports such as wrestling to others, such as men’s soccer (up 135 teams), baseball 
(+ 85) and basketball (+82; GAO).
Even more striking, the GAO Report and NCAA statistics showed that male 
students still received significantly more opportunities and resources, including 
59% of participation opportunities (despite only 47% enrollment), 57% of athletic 
scholarships, 64% of athletic operating expenses, and 68% of recruiting expenses 
(GAO, 2001; NCAA, 2000). Thus, while women’s participation opportunities 
have increased substantially under Title IX, they still lag behind both men’s cur-
rent and pre-1972 levels (GAO). Disparities at the high school level remain even 
greater. The Title IX Commission report cited annual National Federation of State 
High School Athletic Associations participation surveys showing that more than 
1.1 million more male than female high school students receive athletic opportu-
nities. In sum, the facts contained in the report showed that at the high school and 
college levels, females still receive far fewer sport participation opportunities than 
males, and overall sport opportunities for males continue to increase.
The Commission eventually issued a report that made sweeping recommen-
dations for changes in the Title IX guidelines—arguably, changes that directly 
conflicted with the statute itself and legislative history. Commissioners Donna 
deVarona and Julie Foudy issued a minority report that opposed many of the rec-
ommendations and laid out what they believed to be the underlying facts that 
demonstrated men continue to receive preferential treatment in athletics (deVa-
rona, 2003; Foudy, 2003). Both reports generated heated debates, but polls showed 
that Americans recognized the importance of Title IX for promoting equal oppor-
tunity and supported its vigorous enforcement (deVarona; Foudy). Moreover, 
groups such as the National Coalition on Women and Girls in Education and the 
American Bar Association issued a commentary noting that the Commission’s 
recommendations conflicted with the law, its legislative history, and its purpose 
(National Coalition for Women and Girls in Education, 2002) In the end, DOE 
took no substantive action to change any of Title IX’s athletic guidelines because 
DOE Secretary Rod Paige stated he would only accept unanimous recommenda-
tions. Foudy and DeVarona’s minority opinion carried substantial weight even 
though they were outnumbered. DOE subsequently issued a July 2003 letter 
urging more education and technical assistance for schools and more Title IX 
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enforcement but not any backward steps that would harm the letter and spirit of 
the law (Reynolds, 2003).
Part III: The Economic Reality of Intercollegiate 
Athletics and Recommendations for Change
The authors contend that the driving force behind the loss of many men’s sport 
programs over the past 20 years has been a shift in institutional priorities related 
to achieving excellence in football and basketball coupled with economic factors 
involving the arms race, not the drive for equality. In a 2007 article, the sports 
editor for the Chronicle of Higher Education predicted that, “as financial pres-
sures mount, more athletic departments will eliminate sports” (Wolverton, 2007, 
p. A28). In addition, Cheslock (2007) encouraged future research that would 
examine reductions in men’s sports teams in relationship to the arms race in ath-
letic spending at the FBS level. We contend that controlling costs in intercolle-
giate athletics, not changing Title IX guidelines, is they key to ensuring that sports 
such as wrestling, men’s and women’s swimming, men’s and women’s track and 
field, and many other endangered sports will continue to exist on college and uni-
versity campuses.
While several male sports programs have been dropped, comparative spend-
ing on intercollegiate athletic programs has reached almost unsustainable growth 
with overall athletic budgets increasing by 20% between 2001 and 2003 (Orszag 
& Orszag, 2005). During this same time period, institutional spending increased 
only 5% (Orszag & Orszag). Spending in intercollegiate athletics escalates each 
year as institutions strive to attain greater and greater success in a few select 
sports. Over $4.2 billion was spent in 2005–06 to support the operations of the 
FBS athletics programs (Lawrence & Li, 2007). While increased spending in the 
sports of football and men’s basketball is often highlighted most frequently, 
spending in other areas is also escalating.
The Knight Commission, an intercollegiate athletics watchdog group, has 
noted that “[a] frantic, money-oriented modus operandi that defies responsibility 
dominates the structure of big-time football and basketball” (Knight Commission, 
2007, ¶20). The most recent NCAA data indicated that in 2006, only 19 of the 119 
FBS member institutions reported revenues exceeding expenditures if university 
contributions are excluded from the calculation (Fulks, 2008). It is interesting to 
note that no relationship has been found between operational spending on football 
and basketball and increases in winning, operating net revenue, academic quality, 
or alumni giving (Litan, Orszag, & Orszag, 2003). In fact, there is evidence to 
suggest that there is a net zero impact on revenue when examining football and 
basketball expenditures in the FBS, so $1 of football or men’s basketball expendi-
ture results only in an additional $1 of operating revenue (Litan, et al.).
By examining per athlete expenses related to gender specific costs within 
athletic departments, excess becomes apparent. During 2005–06, the average 
expense in the FBS was $58,025 per male student-athlete and $32,308 per female 
student-athlete—an increase of $9,451 and $3,207 from the previous year 
(Lawrence & Li, 2007). It has also been reported that at some FBS institutions, the 
cost of supporting a football player exceeds $100,000 per athlete (Knight 
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Commission, 2007). With respect to football, 41.6% of FBS expenditures allocated 
to a specific sport go to football—26.2% and 29.0% for FCS and Division II with 
football (Cheslock, 2007).
Misplaced Financial Priorities
A recent and salient argument that identifies economic decisions, rather than 
gender equity legislation, as the primary reason for the demise of many male 
sports, is the recent dropping of six men’s sports at Rutgers University in 2006 
(Coalition to Save our Sports, 2008). Rutgers can be viewed as a microcosm of the 
economic realities and high stakes at some major NCAA Division I institutions, 
specifically in the sports of football and men’s basketball.
Rutgers made a decision to substantially increase their financial support for 
football in the late 1990s to pursue the intangibles that a winning football program 
may or may not bring to a university (Associated Press, 2006b; Sack & Stau-
rowsky, 1998; Suggs, 2003). Rutgers hired University of Miami assistant coach 
Greg Schiano to resurrect its football program in 1999. While the program strug-
gled in the early years of Schiano’s tenure, the money needed to make the pro-
gram better flowed in. The program began to win games and become more com-
petitive, culminating in a postseason bowl appearance in 2005. Not wanting to 
stem the success of the football program, even with millions in impending state 
budget cuts affecting the entire university, the athletic department decided to drop 
six men’s sports in 2006 (heavyweight crew, lightweight crew, fencing, swimming 
and diving, tennis), as well as women’s fencing to help meet both the financial 
bottom line and gender equity requirements (Rimbach & Alex, 2006). Rutgers 
officials contended the sports had to be dropped to meet Title IX requirements and 
save $2 million in the face of almost $55 million in major state budget cuts (Asso-
ciated Press, 2006a). However, the athletic department simultaneously detailed 
major increases in expenditures for its football program in the form of facility 
improvements and coaches’ salaries—ironically totaling about $2 million (Asso-
ciated Press, 2006b).
Rutgers’ athletic spending doubled over 7 years, from $23.5 million in 
1998–99 to almost $41 million in 2005–06 (Rimbach & Alex, 2006). Yet the 
money was not allocated evenly across sports, with much of the increase going to 
football and men’s basketball. Football spending at Rutgers has grown from $6.3 
million, or 26.8% of the budget, in 1998–99, to $13 million, or 31.7%, in 2005–06 
(Associated Press, 2006b)
According to the Equity in Athletics Disclosure report for the 2004–05 year, 
Rutgers’ football program broke even with $10.7 million in revenue (Coalition to 
Save our Sports, 2008). However, that included nearly $3 million in university 
support and student fees. Some other examples of increases in football spending 
at Rutgers included incentives for Schiano, who was earning more than $1 million 
per year. The university spent millions on new football facilities, including $12.5 
million for an expansion and renovation of the team’s training center and $175,000 
to house the team in a local hotel for six home games. Rutgers received $1.25 mil-
lion for its 2005 Insight Bowl game, its first bowl appearance in decades. How-
ever, after paying for everyone to go to the game—including players, coaching 
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staff, additional university officials and family members—the university finished 
$19,000 in the red (Associated Press, 2006a).
Rutgers athletic director E. Robert Mulcahy sounds a familiar refrain when 
he argues that the team’s success should not be measured just in financial terms, 
but also by the attention it draws to the university (Associated Press, 2006b; 
Suggs, 2003). Many who support increased investment in football and men’s bas-
ketball programs at the expense of nonrevenue sports programs will point to sev-
eral potential intangibles, such as greater exposure for the university, increased 
athletic and academic donations, increased quality of applicants, and greater mar-
keting and recruiting potential (Suggs). This is often called the “Front Porch 
Theory,” meaning that athletics can be, and possibly is, the main window through 
which the general public views the institution (Suggs). Therefore if the front porch 
is untidy, the rest of the institution will suffer in the aforementioned areas (Suggs). 
Increased expenditures in the sports of football and men’s basketball are intended 
to “repair the porch” but they do not necessarily correlate with greater winning 
percentages or other intangible benefits (Orszag & Orszag, 2005; Sack & Stau-
rowsky, 1998). Still, Rutgers is not the only athletic program to drop sports, male 
and female, in the name of Title IX while pumping more dollars into football and 
men’s basketball programs that are either losing money or breaking even.
The Facility Arms Race
Athletic facility spending has significantly contributed to the escalating costs of 
operating a FBS intercollegiate athletics department. Between 1994 and 2001, 
capital expenditures (e.g., new facility construction, renovation, and capital equip-
ment acquisitions) increased 250% (Knight Commission, 2007). Examples of 
facility expenditures that serve to illustrate this point include one institution that 
dropped a men’s sport program also spent $300,000 on lights for their football 
practice field and then never used the field for practice during the coach’s tenure 
(Lopiano, 2001). Another university dropped its men’s swimming and diving pro-
gram for financial reasons and then renovated the outdoor track and indoor track, 
built a baseball complex (with underground soil-heating elements), added a row 
of skyboxes to the football stadium, and installed artificial turf in the football 
stadium (Lopiano). In summary, some of the same colleges that have significantly 
increased their athletics budgets and increased capital expenditures on facility 
renovation and expansions have chosen to also decrease sport opportunities for 
male athletes.
According to NCAA statistics, even though many male teams have been 
eliminated since the inception of Title IX, women still receive fewer sport oppor-
tunities based upon enrollment figures at public institutions. Carpenter and Acosta 
state that,
Institutions who failed to meet any of the three prongs of the participation test 
all too often decided to manipulate numbers rather than expand opportunities 
. . . the manipulation of numbers typically included terminating the men’s 
“minor” sport teams (e.g., wrestling, gymnastics, and swimming) rather than, 
for example, curbing the excesses of football. (2005, p. 185)
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Reducing Scholarship Expenses
Between the rising cost of tuition and unnecessarily large men’s football scholar-
ship limits, institutions are spending more than ever on athletic scholarships for 
their student-athletes. College tuition increased 35% between 2001 and 2006 
(after adjusting for inflation), which athletic department budgets must absorb 
when awarding athletics aid (College Board, 2006). The NCAA permits 85 full 
football scholarships in The FBS and 63 full football scholarships in the Football 
Championship Subdivision (FCS; formerly Division IAA), but only, 9.9 equiva-
lency scholarships in wrestling (one scholarship can be split among multiple play-
ers; NCAA, 2007d).
In 2002–03 FBS male student-athletes received an average of $2.65 million 
in scholarship dollars per institution, while female student-athletes received $1.96 
million on average (Fulks, 2005). At the FCS level, $1.3 million was spent for 
men’s athletic scholarships and just over $1 million was spent on women (Fulks). 
The large number of football scholarships permitted in the FBS costs institutions 
thousands of extra dollars each year that could be invested in other sport pro-
grams. It is difficult to imagine that football success would diminish if the scholar-
ship limit were reduced by 20 and those 20 new walk-on student athletes became 
tuition-paying students, providing revenue to the university (even though some 
costs are still associated with carrying walk-on student-athletes).
Hypothetically, the redistribution of scholarship money might occur like this: 
Public Institution A is facing a financial shortfall next year and has chosen to 
eliminate 20 football scholarships to help balance the budget. Currently, the insti-
tution has 115 FBS football players, 85 of whom are on full scholarships. The 
average tuition, fees, room, and board in 2006–07 for an in-state student was 
$12,796 (College Board, 2006). By eliminating 20 full scholarships, the athletic 
department (if all of the players were an in-state student, which is extremely rare) 
immediately would save $255,920 per year. Assuming the total roster size 
remained unchanged, the university would net that same amount in tuition income. 
The savings would support the 100% of most wrestling operating budgets at Divi-
sion I institutions considering the relative small wrestling budgets mentioned ear-
lier (U.S. Department of Education Office of Postsecondary Education, 2007).
Reducing Recruiting Expenses
Excessive recruiting costs are rampant at the FBS level. In 2002–03, average 
recruiting expenditures were $378,000 for men’s teams and $163,030 for women’s 
programs (Fulks, 2005). During the same year, FCS schools spent an average of 
$104,000 on recruiting for men and $58,000 for women (Fulks). Among the top 
spending FBS institutions, four schools reported men’s recruiting expenditures 
exceeding $1 million and 50 institutions spent over $500,000 recruiting male 
student-athlete (Lawrence & Li, 2007). No institution reported spending more 
than $500,000 to recruit female student athletes (Lawrence & Li).
The large difference between FBS and FCS expenditures brings up two ques-
tions: “Why are FBS institutions spending over 3 1/2 times more than FCS to 
recruit male student-athletes?” and “Why are FBS institutions spending 1 1/2 
times more than FCS institutions to recruit female student-athletes?” Both divi-
sions seem to have no problem filling rosters with participants, so wouldn’t fis-
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cally sound decision-making lean toward cutting recruiting costs? If the average 
FBS institution reduced its recruiting spending by 10% across the board, the 
remaining money could support the entire scholarship limit for a wrestling team, 
a men’s track and field team, or a men’s swimming team.
Controlling Coaches Salaries
FBS college football coaches are making more money than ever. In 2006, of the 
119 FBS head football coaches, at least 42 were earning $1 million or more (Upton 
& Wieberg, 2006). The percentage of the athletic budget devoted to football sala-
ries also is increasing, accounting for more than 10% of the total athletics operat-
ing budget at one major FBS institution (Estes, 2007).
Controlling coaches’ salaries has been both an emotional and legal issue. 
Every attempt to regulate salaries by the NCAA has been met with stiff resistance 
and legal battles. Currently, without an antitrust exemption, there is little that can 
be done in stemming ever growing salaries unless institutions do it themselves. To 
date institutions seem unwilling to make such decisions unilaterally. However, 
any collusion or restraint of trade will likely result in a costly lawsuit. Conse-
quently some institutions are paying their head football coach far more than the 
entire budget of a wrestling team. If greater discipline were exercised in the area 
of coaches’ salaries, participation opportunities in minor sports could be preserved 
or increased.
Additional Areas of Savings
Apart from salaries, scholarships, and recruiting, a number of other, smaller line-
item expenses can be identified. While they may not be significant individually, 
when added up they produce considerable savings—savings that could be reallo-
cated to increased participation opportunities.
Academic support for student-athletes is a source of potential overspending 
at some institutions. One major FBS institution spent $19.5 million on their aca-
demic support center for student-athletes and has 15 staff members to meet the 
academic needs of student-athletes (Louisiana State University, 2007). These 
indirect costs are spread among walk-on and scholarship student-athletes and can 
add up to significant amounts of money.
This need could be met in other, less expensive ways. Most institutions have 
well developed academic support services for all students on-campus that could 
serve (with some adjustments) many of the needs of student-athletes. Thus, the 
value of separate and special academic support centers for student-athletes should 
be measured in relationship to the advantages of investing this same money in the 
retention or expansion of participation opportunities.
Another area where costs can be cut is related to the football tradition of 
housing athletes at local hotels or motels before home games. One institution 
sequestered its football team at a local hotel before their six home games at a cost 
of $175,000 while, at the same time, cutting its tennis team. The entire tennis 
budget was less than the cost of the football team’s hotel rooms (Rimbach & Alex, 
2006). Another team spent $86,000 just on snack food at a local hotel during pre-
season football training camp (Lopiano, 2001).
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This is not an exhaustive list of line-item expenditures in college athletics and 
the areas discussed do not represent a large portion of the overall athletics budget. 
Neither does a wrestling program. Thus, it is the contention of the authors that all 
expenditures should be examined before a decision to cut a sport to ensure that no 
expenses could be reduced for purposes of saving a sport team.
NCAA Revenue Distribution Model Adjustment
According to the NCAA’s revenue distribution model, the amount of money that 
is paid to conferences during the Division I men’s basketball tournament is enor-
mous, and it increasing each year. “The NCAA’s revenue distribution formula for 
the new CBS contract values each win in the Division I men’s basketball tourna-
ment at $780,000. Thus, the stakes for a foul shot to win a game in the tournament 
will exceed three-quarters of a million dollars” (“Knight Commission,” 2007, 
¶29). The total amount of money available to share among teams in the Division I 
basketball tournament has risen from $75 million in 2001–02 to almost $123 mil-
lion in 2005–06 (NCAA, 2007c). The big winners in 2006–07, taking home the 
most money for their members, were the Big East ($14,856,576), Big 12 
($14,325,984), Big Ten and Atlantic Coast ($14,149,129; NCAA, 2007c). On the 
other end of the spectrum are the eight conferences receiving the minimum payout 
of $1,061,184 (NCAA, 2007c).
Regarding NCAA revenue distribution, expenses, and allocations, as indi-
cated in Tables 1 and 2, about a third of the Division I allocation (34%) is dis-
bursed through the basketball fund, about a third (34%) through broad-based dis-
tribution, 15% to student programs, and 13% for general programs and services. 
The basketball fund monies are paid to Division I conferences based on their per-
formance in the men’s basketball tournament over a six-year period. The pay-
ments are divided into units, with one unit awarded to each institution that partici-
pates in each game, except for the championship (NCAA, 2007b). “In 2006–07, 
each basketball unit will be approximately $177,000 ( 6)” (NCAA, 2007b, p. 
5b). Starting in 1990–91, payments to NCAA member institutions for participa-
tion in NCAA championships other than men’s basketball were eliminated. 
Instead, those monies were funneled into the NCAA’s general budget for general 
distribution (NCAA, 2007a). In short, on average about $1 million is now paid out 
for participating in each game of the men’s basketball tournament ($177,000  
6). However, there is no NCAA institutional/conference payout for participation 
in any other NCAA men’s or women’s championship.
Division I payouts are large for winning in men’s basketball (over $132 mil-
lion in 2006–07) and still handsome for not winning ($1 million for losing in the 
first round)—but there is no NCAA payout for winning competitions in any other 
NCAA men’s or women’s championship bracket. A financial incentive could 
motivate some schools to invest more equitably in their sport programs or even 
retain minor men’s sports and women’s programs if they have a chance for finan-
cial reward for performance.
Other financial incentives for offering a large number of programs are also 
lacking. Only 11% ($44.2 million) of the Division I allocation is distributed on 
team sponsorship. This means that a school would receive only $22,000 per team 
offered above the minimum. If the purpose of higher education is, at least in part, 
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to provide participation opportunities to students, the authors suggest revision of 
the NCAA budget to earmark a significantly greater portion of revenues to col-
leges and universities based on the number of sport teams offered. Perhaps too, a 
greater incentive should be provided for championship participation in sports 
other than basketball.
Table 2 NCAA Division I Breakdown of Expenses/Allocations
Allocation Amount in $millions
Basketball fund 132.6
Broad-based distribution —
 number of varsity sports sponsored 44.2 
 number of athletics grants in aid 88.4 
Student athlete opportunity fund 27.7 
Academic enhancement fund 19.8 
Special assistance fund for student-athletes 12.3 
Conference grants 6.8 
Budget allocations for programs and servicesb 55.0+
Total 389.8 
Table 1 NCAA Revenues and Expenses (2006–2007)
Source
Amount in 
$millions
Percent 
of total
Revenue
Television and marketing rights 
(primarily men’s basketball)
508.3 90.1
Total championships revenue 44.9 —
Investments, fees and services 9.8 —
Membership Dues 1.0 —
Total revenues 564.0 100.0
Expenses
Division I allocation 389.8 69.1
Division II allocation 24.7 4.4
Division III allocation 17.9 3.2
NCAA programs and services 95.2 16.9
 student-athlete welfare and youth programs 22.6 —
 membership programs and services 72.6 —
Administrative services 
(general and administrative expenses/support)
22.8 4.3
Contingencies and reserves 13.6 2.4
Total expenses 564.0 100.0
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Women’s Wrestling
Men’s wrestling advocates continue to overlook the most promising answer to 
their concerns—women’s wrestling. At large institutions, wrestling budgets are 
typically one of the smaller line items. At the NCAA Division I level, wrestling 
budgets range from close to $100,000–200,000 per year for the less competitive 
teams to over $900,000 for the perennial nationally competitive teams, such as the 
University of Iowa (University of Iowa, 2007). By contrast, the University of Iowa 
football budget in 2007 alone was close to 16 million dollars (Fresno State Uni-
versity, 2006; University of Iowa, 2007). Thus, rather than cut men’s wrestling for 
limited savings, wrestlers could encourage schools to add women’s wrestling 
opportunities. The cost of adding women’s teams and opportunities to already 
existing men’s wrestling teams is relatively small compared with football expen-
ditures. Moreover, if men’s teams are balanced with women’s teams, they will less 
likely be considered for elimination when schools face budget cuts. Furthermore, 
the intent and spirit of Title IX is to increase opportunities for women (not to 
decrease opportunities for men). Thus, choosing to add women’s wrestling would 
be consistent with not only the letter of the law, but also the spirit and intent of this 
legislation.
Some successful state and club programs suggest that girls wresting would be 
successful—if opportunities for participation are provided. Three state high school 
athletic association’s (Texas, Hawaii, and Washington) already sanction girls’ 
wrestling with separate state tournaments, and California recognizes girls’ wres-
tling as an exhibition sport (Smith, 2004). As of 2004, nearly 3,800 girls were 
competing on girls’ teams through their schools and the California Women’s 
Wrestling Association (Smith). The United States Girls’ Wrestling Association 
began a high school girls’ national tournament in 1997, and it now sponsors state 
and regional tournaments throughout the nation. Entries have been increasing 
each year (Smith).
Women’s wrestling has flourished at the international level for decades, is 
now a medal sport in the Olympics, and was showcased at the 2008 Beijing Olym-
pics. In Canada, nearly every college with a men’s wrestling team has a sister 
women’s wrestling team (Robinson, 2008). Some American institutions such as 
Menlo College, Missouri Valley, Cumberland, and MacMurray have chosen to 
add women’s wrestling teams and have successfully recruited large numbers of 
women to attend their schools to participate in the sport (Varsity Women’s Wres-
tling Teams, 2008). Other schools have allowed women to participate on their 
men’s teams as a way to train for women’s open competition (Smith). Indeed, this 
was the training ground for such U.S. National team wrestlers as Patricia Miranda 
and Sara McCann (Robinson).
USA Wrestling is responsible for developing national teams and Olympic 
athletes for both men and women (The Mat.com, 2008). The NWCA could poten-
tially double its membership if it encouraged the addition of women’s teams. It is 
time for such organizations to stop spending millions of dollars challenging Title 
IX and to turn those resources and energy toward developing opportunities in the 
sport for women. Together, men’s and women’s wrestling programs could better 
fight sport elimination. Furthermore, they could align with other women’s and 
men’s sport teams to jointly challenge existing resource allocations to football and 
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basketball programs. If successful, the change in strategy could serve to benefit 
current and future wrestlers for many years to come.
NCAA Certification and Sports Sponsorship
The NCAA athletics certification program was adopted at the 1993 NCAA Con-
vention and was designed to hold Division I colleges accountable for athletics 
operations. During the first cycle, through a self-study and peer review process, 
athletics operations were reviewed in the following areas: (a) governance and 
rules compliance, (b) academic integrity, (c) fiscal integrity and (d) equity, welfare 
and sportsmanship. The program is designed to help colleges identify problems 
areas and to correct them (Division I Certification Program, 2008). As part of the 
certification process, each institution is required to complete a gender equity plan 
and is evaluated on aspects of gender equity within the institution (Division I 
Certification Program). For the second cycle, the fiscal operations component has 
been eliminated (Division I Certification Program). To promote full disclosure on 
budget excesses, the authors contend that the fiscal component should be 
reinstated.
Regarding NCAA sport sponsorship, according to NCAA Bylaw 20.9 (2008), 
Division I FBS schools must sponsor at least 16 sports (of which at least 6 must 
be for men and at least 8 for women) and Division I FCS schools must sponsor at 
least 14 sports (of which at least 6 must be for men and at least 7 for women). 
These floor-level requirements have essentially become ceilings for some institu-
tions, inasmuch as some colleges have decided trim sports to the bare minimum 
required by NCAA legislation. The authors suggest that to ensure the continuation 
of broad-based programs, the NCAA membership should consider amending 
NCAA legislation to gradually increase the minimum number of sports required 
for divisional membership. Such action would be consistent with the Division I 
Philosophy Statement which indicates that the offering of extensive opportunities 
for participation in varsity sports is a priority (NCAA, 2008, Bylaw 20.9).
Presidential Philosophical Change
At the core of any institution is the philosophy of the president. In the case of 
athletics, that philosophy dictates decisions related to sport sponsorship, Title IX 
compliance, and spending of athletics dollars. At the presidential level, priorities 
related to intercollegiate athletics and its place within higher education need to be 
reexamined and balanced. University presidents need to take greater responsibil-
ity in acknowledging causes for the current situation and to spearhead future 
efforts for change.
Former University of Michigan President James Duderstadt identifies the 
root of the problem related to the wrestling argument. Duderstadt (2003) places 
blame for the cutting of men’s (and women’s) sport teams on the poor choices 
made by athletics leaders in adopting rule changes in football rather than Title IX 
or women:
When faced with limited resources, sometimes universities perceive, mis-
takenly . . . that their only option is to free up opportunities for women by 
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reducing opportunities for men. . . . It is clearly wrong to place the burden 
of eliminating men’s sports programs on the back of the women’s programs. 
Rather the burden should be placed squarely where it belongs: on the back 
of our football programs. After all, it is the absurd practice of tolerating in 
football a men’s athletics program several times as large as any other sport 
that makes it so hard to achieve gender equity. When the football coaches 
pushed through rule changes to allow unlimited substitution in the 1960s and 
ballooned the size of their sport to involve squad sizes of over one hundred 
players and dozens of coaches per team, they, in effect, sentenced a number 
of men’s sport programs to extinction. The real question is whether we should 
continue to accept a football paradigm with so many players, coaches, and 
expenses at the expense of other sports programs (men’s and women’s). 
(Duderstadt, p. 212)
Duderstadt (2003) primarily blames insufficient presidential leadership for 
allowing football and basketball to be engulfed by the entertainment industry and 
extensively commercialized and professionalized leading to the corruption of col-
lege sports. Furthermore, he states that “[g]ender equity is clearly the right goal 
for higher education” (p. 213). He suggests that university presidents need to step 
up to the plate and be willing to face the pressure to reform college sports (Dud-
erstadt). He also asks whether university presidents should continue to allow foot-
ball excess to negatively affect other men’s and women’s sport teams 
(Duderstadt).
The Knight Commission reinforces this position and believes college presi-
dents and athletics directors need to reexamine priorities related to intercollegiate 
athletics and its place within higher education and to work with the athletics com-
munity to change course.
The plain truth is that one clear and convincing message needs to be sent to 
every member of the academic community: What is needed today is not more 
rules from above, but instead a concerted grassroots effort by the broader aca-
demic community—in concert with trustees, administrators and faculty—to 
restore the balance of athletics and academics on campus (Knight Commission, 
2007, ¶12).
Instead of continuing to compete in the so-called intercollegiate athletic arms 
race and increasing football and basketball budgets at the expense of other sport 
opportunities, presidents need to set the tone from the top and refocus on the value 
of sport for students versus the entertainment value of sport for fans. Athletics 
directors and coaches should also be held responsible for providing leadership in 
this direction.
Capping Men’s Sports
Schools that implement participation limits for men’s sports may find that signifi-
cant benefits result. In general, capping occurs by eliminating most walk-on posi-
tions, which usually does not impact the competitiveness of the team (Women’s 
Sports Foundation, 2000). The cost savings from eliminating extra participants 
then allow those dollars to be redirected toward underfunded men’s sports and 
women’s sports. For institutions seeking to comply with Title IX and considering 
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eliminating a men’s sport to meet the requirements of proportionality, capping 
men’s sport teams may be one option. Institutions also will find that reducing 
walk-on players will achieve the same result as dropping entire teams, but without 
eliminating a sport opportunity. Rosters of men’s sport teams have grown, result-
ing in increased overall participation opportunities for male student-athletes even 
though sport team offerings have essentially stayed the same over time (Cheslock, 
2007). FBS institutions have eliminated more sport teams than FCS and Division 
I without football (formerly IAAA) combined, yet they also have the largest 
number of student-athletes participating per institution (Cheslock, 2007; NCAA, 
2007). Thus, capping sport teams in FBS could lessen the need to drop teams as a 
means to achieve compliance with Title IX.
State Legislation
Another area that should be explored is state gender equity legislation. More than 
20 states have enacted some sort of gender equity legislation (Women’s Sports 
Foundation, 2000). There have been a variety of approaches to helping institutions 
become more equitable. In Florida, institutions are held accountable for following 
their own gender equity plan; institutions not in compliance with Title IX cannot 
compete for state grants and may have state funding withheld (Curtis & Grant, 
2007). In Louisiana, institutions are provided up to 50 tuition waivers for female 
student-athletes per year; in Washington, specific funding has been set aside to 
build women’s sports facilities; and in New Mexico, money is allocated to state 
institutions to improve gender equity (Curtis & Grant; Women’s Sports Founda-
tion). These examples of state legislative actions are an excellent way to help 
institutions seek out new revenue without jeopardizing existing athletic teams.
Economic Change and the Tax Exempt Status of the NCAA
Another issue often raised is whether the enterprise of intercollegiate athletics, 
specifically at the FBS level, contributes to the educational mission of the institu-
tion (Splitt, 2004). Many outside reform groups, such as The Drake Group (TDG), 
are pursuing a review of the NCAA’s tax exempt status as a means to encourage 
academic integrity, and to contain costs. Congress is looking at the issue as well: 
In November 2006, Rep. Bill Thomas, former chair of the House Ways and Means 
Committee, sent a 16-page letter to NCAA President Myles Brand (Thomas, 
2006). The letter asked pointed questions about whether the NCAA deserves its 
tax exemption and whether its mission supports nonprofit higher education 
(Thomas). Opponents would argue that less money means less opportunity, but 
supporters counter that forcing the enterprise to live within its means can enhance 
greater opportunity for all by curbing frivolous expenses and encouraging more 
reasonable spending for all sports, not just for a select few.
Big 10 Conference Commissioner Jim Delany reluctantly admits that remov-
ing the tax exempt status of Division I institutions might force institutions to chan-
nel funding into what is needed, rather than continue the excesses that contribute 
little to the educational mission of the university (Splitt, 2004). In a CNN/SI inter-
view, Delany alluded to the fact that controlling costs might increase the funding 
levels for certain sports. Specifically, he stated, “We would be foolish to try and 
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defend some of the things we do. There are things that we do that are excessive, 
things like hotels and charter travel and the like. . . . [W]e might even be more 
efficient if we were taxed. It may end up helping us” (Munson, 2006, p. 2). If 
institutions are held more accountable for the dollars they are spending and are 
taxed for excessive expenditures, perhaps athletic dollars would be managed 
better and allocated more equitably. Such action would serve to provide greater 
transparency and accountability.
Conclusion
After more than 30 years, supporters of wrestling are still focused on the wrong 
foes: women and Title IX. As discussed throughout this article, the root causes of 
the loss of college wrestling teams arguably can be found in out-of-control and 
unfair economics in big-time college athletic programs—specifically, the reallo-
cation of money from some men’s sports (such as wrestling) to other men’s sports 
(such as football, basketball, and even baseball). Overall, men still receive prefer-
ential treatment in college athletic programs, but within the men’s programs, some 
men’s sports clearly receive better treatment than others. In this kind of athletic 
landscape, it is difficult to argue that the problem lies primarily with Title IX.
The authors conclude that legal and legislative actions challenging Title IX 
have been exhausted and are like to remain ineffectual in preserving opportunities 
for males in sports like wrestling. Therefore, it is time for a new game plan—one 
that will focus on reducing costs and managing the intercollegiate athletics enter-
prise more appropriately. The examples provided show that resources are avail-
able to fully fund sports such as wrestling through a reallocation of existing athlet-
ics dollars. Wrestling advocates are therefore advised to work collaboratively with 
Title IX advocates as well as proponents of women’s sport teams and other men’s 
minor sport programs so that greater attention is placed on providing broad-based 
sport participation opportunities for both men and women.
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